Decision Making in Uncertain and Changing Environments by Karl Schlag & Andriy Zapechelnyuk
Decision Making in Uncertain and Changing
Environments
Karl H. Schlagy Andriy Zapechelnyukz
June 18, 2009
Abstract
We consider an agent who has to repeatedly make choices in an uncertain
and changing environment, who has full information of the past, who discounts
future payos, but who has no prior. We provide a learning algorithm that
performs almost as well as the best of a given nite number of experts or
benchmark strategies and does so at any point in time, provided the agent
is suciently patient. The key is to nd the appropriate degree of forgetting
distant past. Standard learning algorithms that treat recent and distant past
equally do not have the sequential epsilon optimality property.
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11 Introduction
Real-life processes are very complex, and even a mathematician who is skilled in
computing optimal strategies may nd decision making in a natural environment to
be a daunting task. People often cope with such tasks by seeking advice of experts,
imitating their peers or business partners. This typically does not solve the problem
as the amount of advice one receives seems to increase in the complexity of the
environment. The choice is shifted to a dierent level, to decide whose advice to
follow. Given that the environment is constantly changing, the problem is further
complicated, as one wants to be exible enough to switch to a dierent expert if there
is a sign that the current one is not providing the best advice any more. Flexibility
has to be sucient in order to prevent the decision maker from wishing to abandon
the strategy in favor of a dierent one after a particular, possibly unlikely sequence
of events. So one needs strategies that are sequentially rational, much in the spirit of
focusing on subgame perfection instead of Nash. There exists an extensive literature
both in machine learning1 and economics2 that provides simple learning algorithms
for natural environments. However, we show that these are not sequentially rational.
So the question of existence of a simple algorithm remains.
The environment considered in this paper is as follows. A decision maker (for
short, Agent) repeatedly makes decisions in an unknown environment (Nature). In
every discrete period of time Agent chooses an action and, simultaneously, a state of
Nature is realized. Agent's payo in a given period depends on her action, as well
as on the realized state. We assume that all past states are observable by Agent.
Agent can thus compute the payo that would have been realized by each action in
each past period, a scenario also referred to as learning under \foregone payos" or
\full information".3 Agent has no prior beliefs about Nature's behavior: it may be
as simple as a deterministic sequence of states or a stationary stochastic process, or
1Littlestone and Warmuth (1994); Cesa-Bianchi et al. (1996); Vovk (1998); Auer and Long (1999);
Foster and Vohra (1999); Freund and Schapire (1999); Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi (2003, 2006); Green-
wald and Jafari (2003); Cesa-Bianchi et al. (2007); Gordon et al. (2008).
2Hannan (1957); Foster and Vohra (1993, 1997, 1998); Fudenberg and Levine (1995, 1999); Hart
and Mas-Colell (2000, 2001a); Lehrer (2003); Hart (2005).
3In Section 8 we show how to extend our analysis to the multi-armed bandit setting where only
own payos are observable.
2as complicated as strategic decisions of a hostile player who seeks to inict Agent
maximum harm. So Agent is trying to learn in a distribution-free environment.
We do not aspire to nd the rst best strategy for Agent. In fact, this is an
impossible task if one does not add priors, which is equivalent to adding structure
on the environment. Since Nature's complexity is unbounded, even a very patient
Agent cannot hope to \learn" Nature's behavior. Instead, we wish to nd a strategy
so that Agent performs as well as those surrounding her that are facing the same
environment. These can be experts that are making recommendations to Agent,
other agents that are also making choices, or simply strategies that Agent considers
as benchmarks. In what follows we summarize these three entities in the term expert
and assume that these experts are given and nite in number. It is important that
we allow Agent to observe past states so that the past performance of each of these
experts can be evaluated.4 The objective of Agent is to perform similarly to the best
of the experts without prior knowledge which expert is actually the best.5 That is,
she wishes to guarantee that the expected sum of the discounted future payos is
close to or above that of each expert. Moreover, Agent aims to achieve this objective
not only in the rst period, but at any point in time. So, we search for a strategy that
is dynamically consistent. This prevents Agent from choosing some strategy in period
1 and then changing her mind at some later time after a particular sequence of events
(thus precluding the problem of choosing some strategy when knowing in advance
that it will not be carried out). Moreover, Agent will also prefer not to change her
strategy after she has made a mistake. This is just the standard condition of sequential
rationality (or subgame perfection) that demands optimality of a strategy after every
history { including those that have zero probability.
We nd that a strategy need not be very complex to achieve this objective. We
design a simple learning algorithm for Agent that guarantees the expected sum of the
discounted future payos to be "-close to that of the best of the experts, consistently
in all periods of time, regardless of Nature's behavior. Furthermore, we show that
Agent can approach the performance of the best expert arbitrarily closely, provided
she is suciently patient. The algorithm is described as follows. In every period,
4Alternatively, one can assume that Agent does not observe past states but instead observes own
past payo as well as those of all experts (see also Section 7).
5In fact, dierent experts may be best in dierent periods.
3Agent assesses the past performance of each expert (a weighted sum of the payos
that Agent would have gotten if she always followed that expert's advice in the past).
Then Agent follows an expert's advice with probability proportional to how much
better that expert performed in the past relative to Agent herself, similarly to Hart
and Mas-Colell's regret matching strategy (Hart and Mas-Colell, 2000, 2001a).6
The key to our strategy designed for Agent is the way in which the past per-
formance of experts is assessed. Unlike Hart and Mas-Colell (2000), where all past
periods count equally, here Agent puts higher weights on more recent events, regard-
ing more distant events and associated foregone payos as less relevant. Though this
way of treating the past has been well documented in the psychology literature as the
recency eect (see Ray and Wang 2001 and the references within) and has been used
in a few papers (Roth and Erev, 1995; Erev and Roth, 1998), here this has a strategic
reason. The ability to gradually forget the past helps Agent to adapt to changing
environments. In contrast, incorporating all past events equally makes the strategy
too inexible, and, indeed, we show that the regret matching strategy of Hart and
Mas-Colell (2000) does not satisfy the sequential rationality property.
It is important to note that Agent herself cannot compute expected future payos
neither for her strategy nor for the experts, since she does not know Nature's behavior;
computation is possible only from an observer's point of view. Yet, with our algorithm
Agent can make a comparative statement about her expected future payos relative
to the experts'. We provide a bound on how much Agent's expected payos can dier
from that of the best expert and show that Agent can perform arbitrarily close to
or better than the best of the experts provided she is suciently patient. We also
extend this result to the setting where we allow for errors in observing outcomes.
This paper is dierent from the existing literature in three aspects. The rst
aspect relates to the richness of our setting. The set of Agent's actions, as well
as the set of states of Nature, need not be nite, as opposed to those in nite-
game models such as Fudenberg and Levine (1995, 1999); Hart and Mas-Colell (2000,
2001a). Agent's utility function need not be linear or convex, and the experts need
not play deterministic strategies, as it is assumed throughout the machine learning
6Alternatively, Agent chooses a convex combination of the experts' recommendations with weights
proportional to the correspondent dierences in performance, if Agent's action space is convex and
her utility function is concave.
4literature.
The second dierence from the literature concerns the objective that we specify
for Agent. Future payos are discounted in line with classic decision theory. In each
period these cumulated payos are compared to those of the experts. In contrast,
the existing literature uses time-averaging and evaluates payos from the perspective
of the rst period only (see Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi, 2006, and references within).
Furthermore, we compare expected payos of strategies used by Agent and experts
while the existing literature compares realized payos and establishes almost sure
bounds. For better comparison to this literature we formulate our results in terms of
probabilistic bounds in Appendix B.
In fact, Agent's discount factor plays a novel role in this setting. A less patient
Agent has higher goals as she aspires to achieve higher period-by-period payos. The
reason is that Agent wishes to do as well as the best expert. Payos accumulated from
following the best expert in each short run will be higher than that from following
the single best expert in the long run. But, of course, a less patient Agent has greater
diculties in learning, as she needs to learn which expert is best in each short run.
Depending on which eect is greater, from the viewpoint of an outside observer, a
more patient agent may or may not perform on average better than a less patient
one.
The third dierence of our paper from the literature is that we achieve our objec-
tive by conditioning future choices on a weighted assessment of past payos, putting
larger weights on more recent periods. In contrast, practically all strategies found in
the literature condition future play on time-averages of the past performance. As we
show in this paper, they thus lack the property of dynamic consistency and hence
cannot guarantee Agent's sum of discounted future payos to be close to that of the
best expert in all periods. The problem of time averaging of the past is that it even-
tually leads to an inability to react to changes in the environment. As time passes,
a decision maker adds smaller and smaller weights on new observations and thus re-
quires increasingly large body of evidence to change her opinion once it is settled.
So, a decision maker who treats past events equally is likely to end up in a situation
where in response to a changing environment she would prefer to \forget" all the past
and start afresh, with an empty history, rather than to continue using the original
5strategy.
There are a few papers that previously considered discounting of past payos.
Roth and Erev (1995) and Erev and Roth (1998) use reinforcement learning models
with a small degree of \gradual forgetting" to explain experimental data on some
simple games, such as the ultimatum bargaining game. Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi
(2006) consider maximizing discounted past payos as Agent's objective (while we
use this assessment of previous performance only to determine Agent's future play).
Marden et al. (2007) study a special class of nite games that are acyclic in better
replies and show that if all players play strategies based on discounted past payos
with inertia, their play converges to a Nash equilibrium.
The paper is organized as follows. We begin with a motivational example (Section
2). The model is described in Section 3. In Section 4 we introduce strategies based
on past payos and state our main result. Section 5 discusses the role of adaptation
in Agent's behavior and highlights what happens when there is too little adaptation
(as in models that condition on time-average payos) or too much adaptation. In
Section 6 we discuss the role of Agent's discount factor. Section 7 expands the main
result to noisy environments. Section 8 concludes. All proofs omitted in the text are
deferred to Appendix A. In Appendix B we derive probabilistic bounds on realized
discounted future payos.
2 Motivational Example
Let us start with a brief motivational example. Consider an investor who trades on
a stock exchange and makes a portfolio rebalancing decision once a week. There are
various possibilities how the investor can make decisions. She may follow the lead of
some respectable company and hold the same portfolio; she may choose to use one
of a variety of analytical tools for evaluation of the future dynamics of the nancial
market, applying it to information obtained from diverse sources. Whose lead to
follow? Which analytical tool to use? Which source of information to trust? These
are the questions that the investor needs to answer.
In our terminology, any basis for decision making (a company whose lead is fol-
lowed, or an analytical tool in combination with an information source) is called an
6expert who provides advice. The task of the investor is to choose which expert to fol-
low in every decision that she makes. Unfortunately, there does not exist (and cannot
exist in principle) a universally good expert. Following advice of a particular expert
can bring benet or loss, depending on future states of Nature. Some experts provide
the best advice when the economy is steadily growing; others when it is declining;
and others when there is a large degree of uncertainty and uctuations on the stock
market.
We assume that the investor has no prior information or beliefs about future states
of Nature and about quality of advice of various experts. Yet, we design a strategy
for the investor, based on available experts' advice, that yields the expected annual
return nearly as high as the best portfolio among those recommended by the experts,
steadily over time, provided that the investor is suciently patient.
We illustrate our result by the following stylized example. Suppose that the
investor has a certain cash fund and three instruments at her disposal. She can write
a certain number of binary call options that the S&P 500 ends the week with a growth,
binary put options that the S&P 500 ends the week with a decline, or she can keep
cash in bank. Assume that each option costs 50;000 and yields 100;000 if the event
occurs (thus yielding 100% of conditional return), and otherwise expires worthless (a
conditional loss of 100%). The bank yields a safe annual return of 5:2% (or 0:1% per
week). Short-selling of the instruments is not allowed.7
Denote by xt(j) the fraction of instrument j in the investor's portfolio in period
t, where j indicate one of the three instruments, call option, put option, or cash. In
every period t the investor receives the return (net of the cost of the portfolio) of
ut = xt(call) xt(put)+0:001xt(cash) in the event of growth and ut =  xt(call)+
xt(put) + 0:001  xt(cash) in the event of decline. The present-value payo of the






where  is the investor's discount factor.
7Usually, a binary call (put) option would be conditioned on the event that the S&P 500 grows
(declines) by x points, x > 0. For simplicity we choose x = 0 and forbid short sales to prevent
arbitrage. One can easily construct a slightly more complex example with x > 0 and then also allow
for short sales.
7Consider the following strategy of the investor. For every period t denote by
u
j
t the return in period t of the portfolio that consists only of instrument j, j 2
fcall;put;cashg. Next, denote by C;t(j) the weighted average value of holding the
portfolio consisting of instrument j up to period t,













be the weighted average of past payos of the investor. Thus C;t(j) is a measure of
the value of holding the portfolio consisting of instrument j in all previous periods,
putting highest weight on the most recent periods. Similarly, C;t(0) is a measure
of how well the investor has performed. The excess weighting of recent past will be
instrumental to ensure good performance of the strategy when the environment is
changing.
The strategy prescribes to hold the portfolio with fraction of instrument j pro-
portional to [C;t(j)   C;t(0)]+ = maxfC;t(j)   C;t(0);0g, that is,
xt+1(j) =
[C;t(j)   C;t(0)]+ P
j02fcall;put;cashg [C;t(j0)   C;t(0)]+
;
whenever C;t(j)  C;t(0) for some j, and otherwise chooses an arbitrary portfolio
(for instance, keep the one from the previous period). Thus, only recommendations
of experts whose performance is evaluated superior to own will be followed, the prob-
ability of following the recommendation of any such expert being proportional to how
much better he performed.
We show that a suciently patient investor ( close enough to 1) can guarantee
an expected discounted future payo that is arbitrarily close to the best that can
be obtained by any portfolio that remains constant over time. This is true from the
perspective of any period t, evaluating future payos with discount factor , no matter
what states of Nature will be realized in future. The value 1    can be considered
as the rate of adaptation of the investor's portfolio, and it has to be ne-tuned to
guarantee the best result. If  is too close to 1, then the rate of adaptation is very
slow. For example, in the case when a long series of growth is followed by a long
8series of decline, it will take the investor a substantial period of time to adapt and
cause her to hold a big share of call options in the portfolio for a long time. If  is too
small, then the investor reacts to every uctuation of the events, and her portfolio
will be too volatile and susceptible to small uctuations. As we show later, the right
balance dictates to choose 1    to be of the order of
p
1   .
To be more specic, suppose that it turns out that the annual rate of return on the
call option is equal to 20%, resulting from the S&P 500 exhibiting a weekly growth
x% more often than a decline. Then the above strategy guarantees the investor the
expected annual rate of return 20% "(), where "() converges to zero as the level of
the investor's patience, , approaches 1. If instead the annual rate of the put option is
20%, then this strategy will yield the same expected annual rate of return, 20% "().
In fact, given such a limited set of instruments, the worst case for the investor is a
constant uctuation of the S&P 500 around zero with no long-run tendency of growth
or decline, where the best portfolio is to hold 100% of cash in a bank. In this case the
above strategy guarantees the investor the annual rate of return of 5%   "(). Thus,
this strategy is almost as safe as keeping cash in a bank, yet it allows the investor to
obtain much more whenever there exists a portfolio that yields a higher return.
3 Preliminaries
A decision maker (for short, Agent) repeatedly faces an uncertain environment (re-
ferred to as Nature). In every discrete period of time t = 1;2;::: Agent chooses an
action at from a set A of available actions, and, simultaneously, a state of Nature,
!t 2 
, is realized. There are also N experts (or benchmark strategies) who, before
each period, make recommendations to Agent about what action to choose; expert j
recommends an action a
j
t from A in period t. Let u be Agent's payo function, so
u(a;!) 2 R is Agent's payo when choosing action a in state !. We assume that
A and 
 are compact measurable sets (nite or innite), and u : A  
 ! R is
measurable and bounded. In every period Agent may condition her choice on the
recommendations of the experts made for that period as well as on everything that
happened in previous periods. There is perfect information about everything that
occurred in the past. Specically, Agent can observe for each past period the ac-
9tions chosen by each of the experts as well the state of Nature that occurred. In
particular, Agent can derive for each previous period t and each expert j the utility
she would have received if she had followed the recommendation of expert j in that
period. Denote by ae =
 
a1;:::;aN
2 AN a prole of actions recommended by the
N experts, by h := (at;ae
t;!t)1
t=1 a sequence (or path) of actions, recommendations
and states, and by ht := ((a1;ae
1;!1);:::;(at;ae
t;!t)) the history of play up to t. Let
H be the set of all nite histories including the empty history. A strategy of Agent
is a map8 p : H  AN ! (A) that associates with every history ht 1 and every
prole of recommendations ae a randomized action in A to be played in period t.
For short, we write pt = p(ht 1;ae) for the randomized action chosen by Agent in
period t: Similarly, each expert j is endowed with a strategy pj : H ! (A) where
p
j
t = pj (ht 1) is the randomized action belonging to A that is recommended in
period t by expert j after ht 1 has occurred. The state of Nature realized in period
t may also depend on what happened previously, formally it is described by a map
q : H ! (
) where qt = q(ht 1) denotes the randomized state of Nature that occurs
in period t conditional on the previous history ht 1. We assume that the utility of
Agent is bounded. In fact, all we need is that the set of possible utilities that can be
generated by following some expert after some history is bounded. To simplify further
exposition, we can transform Agent's utility function anely so that whenever Agent
follows any expert's recommendation, her utility is contained in the interval [0;I] for
some I > 0.9
It is as if Agent faces an opponent, called Nature, that chooses a state based on
the strategy q which is unknown to Agent. Agent could be facing a deterministic
sequence of states or a stochastic process independent of Agent's actions. Equally,
the sequence of future states may depend on past actions of the Agent and of the
experts. For instance, it could be that Nature has its own objectives and is engaged
in a repeated game with Agent. In particular, we include the case in which Nature
knows the strategy p of Agent and is adversarial in the sense that it aims to inict
maximal \harm" on Agent.
The experts have various interpretations. Note that Agent need not know strategy
8(B) denotes the set of probability distributions over a nite set B.
9Let u = inffu(pj (h);!) : h 2 H;! 2 
g and let I = supfu(pj (h);!) : h 2 H;! 2 
g   u.
Then replace in the original utility function u(a;!) by (u(a;!)   u).
10pj of an expert j. She knows only realizations of j's recommended actions (in the
current period as well as in all past periods). Thus, in our setting experts may know
more about the environment than Agent does. Some experts may even know Nature's
strategy q, though, of course, it does not mean that they will reveal the best actions
to Agent. One interesting interpretation is that experts are forecasters. An expert
makes a forecast of a next-period state of Nature (it could be a point forecast, a
condence interval, a distribution, etc.). Then Agent's problem is to decide which
expert to follow, or possibly how to aggregate the forecasts of the dierent experts.
On the other hand, in some applications it is plausible to assume that the strategies
pj of the experts are known by Agent. Such a setting emerges when there are no
explicit experts but instead each pj describes an algorithm, a benchmark strategy,
that Agent wants to compare her own performance to. This approach is popular in
the computer science literature (see Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi, 2006, and references
within). When the set of actions is nite, then it is common in the literature (e.g.,
Hannan, 1957; Fudenberg and Levine, 1995; Hart and Mas-Colell, 2001a) to consider
as benchmarks the set of constant strategies fpa;a 2 Ag as experts where pa species
to play a 2 A in every period, irrespective of the history of play.
In this paper we assume that the set of experts or benchmarks is given. How the
experts are selected is not considered here (see some comments in Section 8 below).
We would like to note that everything goes through if the set of feasible actions and
states are time dependent, at;a
j
t 2 At and !t 2 
t where At and 
t are endowed with
the same properties as A and 
 dened above. Similarly, everything holds if, as in a
more classic decision making setting, outcomes are observable while states are not. In
this case X is a set of outcomes, u : X ! R is bounded and q : A
 ! (X) is the
underlying process that generates outcomes given actions chosen and states realized.
Agent's payos accumulated in dierent periods are combined as in classical deci-
sion making by means of discounting. Agent discounts future payos with a discount
factor  2 (0;1). For given strategies p and q, Agent's expected utility at time t0 is












Note that these expectations only refer to the randomness inherent in p and q.
Agent herself does not know q, and hence cannot compute these expectations. We
assume that Agent has no prior beliefs about Nature's behavior q (a distribution-
free environment). We will be measuring how well Agent's strategies perform in this
unknown, possibly, hostile environment. Instead of assigning a prior on Nature's
behavior and nding a Bayesian-optimal strategy, or applying some standard non-
Bayesian approach, such as the maximin objective of nding the best strategy against
the worst-case scenario, we consider a very simplistic objective. The objective of
Agent is to perform nearly as well as the best expert, regardless of what Nature does
and without knowing in advance which expert is actually the best. Moreover, we
assume that this objective is maintained after any history. To put it formally, we say
that strategy p is sequentially "-as good as strategy p0 if for every strategy q of Nature,
every period t0 and every history ht0 1,
Ut0;(p;qjht0 1)  Ut0;(p
0;qjht0 1)   ":
A strategy p is sequentially "-optimal w.r.t. the given experts if it is sequentially
"-as good as every pj, j 2 J = f1;2;:::;Ng.11 This is the analogue of the concept
of contemporaneous perfect "-equilibrium introduced by Mailath et al. (2005) in the
context of repeated games (see also Radner, 1980). Finally, we say that a strategy p
is sequentially "-optimal if it is sequentially "-optimal w.r.t. any set of experts.
The requirement that the expected performance evaluated in period t0 be "-as
good as that of every expert irrespective of the previous history ht0 1 is of particular
importance in this paper. On the one hand, this is a dynamic consistency constraint
on Agent's objective: if Agent decides to choose a strategy p in period t0, she should
10Strategies p and q, together with an initial history ht0 1, dene a stochastic process that de-
termines a probability measure over histories in H; the expectation is taken with respect to that
measure. Note that formally the stochastic process depends also on the strategies of the experts,
but we omit them in the notations as we assume these strategies are given as a part of the problem
description.
11An expert's strategy can be treated as the same mathematical object as Agent's strategy, with
the property that it does not depend on experts' recommendations.
12not change her mind in any period t > t0. A strategy that does not satisfy this con-
straint would require Agent's commitment at period t0 to an innite sequence of future
decisions. On the other hand, this is a condition of sequential rationality (or subgame
perfection) that ensures optimal behavior of Agent even after zero-probability histo-
ries achieved by \mistakes" in past decisions of Agent or Nature. In particular, we
do not restrict Agent to start with the empty history, the problem is well dened for
every initial history, regardless of the way it has been reached.
4 Conditioning on the Past
In this paper we regard Agent as an unsophisticated, non-Bayesian decision maker
who uses her past \experience" in a simple way. More specically, we will consider
strategies where decisions of Agent depend in a simple way on own past performance,
as well as on that of the experts. Loosely speaking, Agent will choose to follow advice
of those experts who performed better than she did. An important part of this paper
will deal with how to appropriately measure past performance. Note that this should
not be confused with the fact that future payos are evaluated using discount factor
:
The standard in the literature (see Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi, 2006, and references
within) is to condition next choice in period t + 1 on average past performance (i.e.
the arithmetic mean) of self and of each of the experts, averaging over periods from 1
to t. We say that performance is measured using past average payos if performance
up to time t given history ht is evaluated by its average in periods from 1 to t. Agent's














In this paper we focus on the setting where past performance is measured with
\decay", assigning a higher weight to more recent experiences, referred as discounted
past payos. Specically, for  2 (0;1) and every j 2 J dene the past -discounted
13payo at period t = 1;2;::: recursively by setting C;0(j) = 0, and for every t  1
C;t(j) = C;t 1(j) + (1   )u(a
j
t;!t): (2)
To put it dierently, C;t(j) is dened as







Analogously, the past -discounted payo C;t(0) of Agent is dened.
One may choose to interpret discounting of past payos as a decay of past in-
formation, an active underweighing of older outcomes as these are perceived as less
relevant than recent events. The discounted past payo, C;t (j), is an aggregate of
the past information, and according to the recursive formula (2), every new piece of
information receives the weight of 1  in this aggregate, thus the term 1  can be
viewed as Agent's rate of adaptation to new conditions. Indeed, large 1    means
that Agent places a considerable weight on new information and adjusts the aggre-
gate values fast; 1    close to zero means that Agent places a little weight on new
information, and the aggregate values change slowly. In this sense, the evaluation
according to past average payos can be considered as declining rate of adaptation,
the rate of adaptation in period t being equal to 1=t.
It is worth noting that strategies based on discounted past payos are not compu-
tationally demanding. Agent need not remember all the past information, she only
needs to know the current values of the discounted past payos and to update them
by the recursive formula (2) in every period.
Consider a strategy p such that for every period t Agent's next-period behavior
depends only on her evaluation of the past performance of the N experts as well
as on her own past performance. That is, given a vector xt 2 RN+1 consisting of
performance measure xt (0) of Agent and xt (j) of expert j; j = 1;::;N, the next
period mixed action of Agent is a function of xt only: pt+1 = (xt). Such a strategy p
is called a better-reply strategy if for every period t, whenever xt (j)  xt (0) for some
j 2 J,
xt(j) < xt (0) ) pt+1(j) = 0; j 2 J: (4)
The better-reply property is a natural condition that stipulates to never follow the
advice of those experts whose performance is inferior to Agent's own performance.
14The related literature in this area has chosen to explain everything in terms of
regret (see Appendix A for formal denitions). For each expert one computes the
regret of not following this expert in a given period as the dierence between the
payo of that expert and own payo. The choice among experts is governed by the
average regret of not following recommendations of these experts. The better-reply
condition on Agent's strategy means to never follow the advice of an expert that Agent
has negative regret for not following his advice in the past. While the interpretations
are dierent, mathematically the two approaches are identical. We provide a few
examples that come from this literature.
Example 1 The better reply strategy pt+1 =  (xt) is the regret matching strategy
(Hart and Mas-Colell, 2000) if the recommendation of expert j is followed with prob-
ability proportional to how much better expert j performed than Agent in the past,
formally, if (x) is dened for every j 2 J by
j(x) =
[x(j)   x(0)]+ P
k2J [x(k)   x(0)]+
(5)
whenever x(j0)  x(0) for some j0 2 J, where [z]+ = maxf0;zg.12







is called the lp-norm strategy (Hart and Mas-Colell, 2001a; Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi,









k2J [x(k)   x(0)]
p 1
+
whenever x(j0)  x(0) for some j0 2 J. In particular, the l2-norm strategy is equal to
the regret matching strategy. The l1-norm strategy assigns probability 1 on experts
with the highest performance. It is equivalent to the ctitious play (Brown, 1951)
if performance is measured using past average payos. For large p, the lp-norm
strategies based on past average payos approximate ctitious play and are called
smooth ctitious play.13
12 This strategy should not be confused with the regret matching strategy applied to conditional
regrets that was also introduced by Hart and Mas-Colell (2000).
13Fudenberg and Levine's (1995) original denition of smooth ctitious play is dierent and does
not satisfy the better-reply condition (4).
15We can now state our main result. For given  2 (0;1) the regret matching strategy
based on past -discounted payos, denoted by p; is the strategy dened at each time
t by applying the regret matching rule (5) to the vector of performance assessments
given by C;t.
Theorem 1 For every " > 0 there exists 0 2 (0;1) such that the following holds.
For every   0 there exists  2 (0;1) such that p is sequentially "-optimal.
This result follows directly from Propositions 1 and 2 below. Theorem 1 states
that a suciently patient Agent can guarantee the expected utility to be arbitrarily
close to that achieved by the best of the experts consistently in all periods. This
is true without any knowledge about Nature's behavior and without any possibil-
ity of assessing ex-ante which expert's strategy is actually the best as measured by
discounted future payos.
It is important to note that we provide a uniform bound on the dierence between
discounted future payos of Agent and the best expert. This bound is independent of
time and history of past play. In contrast, the existing literature (e.g., Hart and Mas-
Colell, 2001a; Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi, 2003) oer strategies based on time-average
past payos that guarantee Agent's (long-run average) payos to be as good as the
best expert, but not uniformly: the later the period the worse the bound. This insight
is the basis of Proposition 4 below.
We rst establish an upper bound for given  on how far Agent can fall short
from performing as good as the best expert in the given environment.
Proposition 1 Given discount factor  the regret-matching strategy p based on past
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All proofs are deferred to the Appendix. Looking at (6) we see that the number of
experts N essentially enters with factor
p
N. The bound is general in the sense that
it only depends on the number of experts, not on their specic strategies. Adding
an expert increases the highest payo that Agent aspires to reach, the increase is
strict when she faces an environment in which this new expert is better than all the
rest. An addition of any additional expert comes at the cost of strictly reducing how
16close Agent can guarantee, according to (6), to be to the highest payo among the
experts. Thus, adding or removing experts may or may not be benecial for Agent.
The question of how to choose experts is not considered in this paper (see a brief
discussion in Section 8).
We now show that p is sequentially "-optimal for an appropriate choice of . The
value  = () is chosen to minimize " = "(;) over all  2 (0;1) where "(;)
is given in (6). To get a feeling for how  depends on  when " is small we derive
approximations of the bound "( ();) when  is close to 1: These are supplemented
with approximations of "(;) to highlight the trade-o between  and :14
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In order for (6) to be small, Agent has to be very patient ( large) and has to
choose a value of decay of information 1    that is small in absolute terms but
relatively large in comparison to 1   . Following (9), the best choice of  when 
is large is to let decay have the same magnitude as the square root of the distance
between  and 1: To gain a feeling for (8) consider  close to 1: Note that 1
1  can be
interpreted as the mean time horizon of Agent as (1   )
P1
t=1 tt 1 = 1
1 : Then in
order to reduce the bound on maximal expected regret by 10% Agent has to increase
mean time horizon by roughly 50% (as 1
0:94  1:52) and consequently increase the
mean time horizon of looking into the past by roughly 25% (as 1
0:92  1:23).
We numerically calculate  and " = "(();) and compare these to the ap-
proximations ^  and ^ " in (8) and (9) in Proposition 2 and show the values in Table 4,
where we set I = 1.
So for instance, when there are two experts and 1    = 10 6, then we can
guarantee future expected payos to be no worse than 0:065 as compared to those
14For two real-valued functions f;g we write f = O(g) if there exists a constant L such that
jf()j  Ljg()j.
17N 1    1       ^  " "   ^ "
2 10 6 5:3  10 4 3  10 5 0:0653 5:4  10 5
2 10 5 1:76  10 3 1:8  10 4 0:189 1:07  10 4
2 10 4 6  10 3 0:001 0:2206 6  10 4
4 10 6 5  10 4 0 0:0898  1:64  10 3
Table 1: Numeric examples
of the best expert. Here 0:065 can be interpreted as 6:5% of the maximal payo
dierence as utility has been normalized in this table to be contained in [0;1]:
The literature on no-regret decision making concerns less for expected payos than
providing almost sure upper bounds on the dierence in payos. In Appendix B we
present probabilistic bounds on how close Agent's discounted future payos are to
those of the best expert. Following Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi (2006), almost sure
bounds are not available when discounting past payos.
5 The Role of the Rate of Adaptation
In the previous section we showed that the rate of adaptation, 1   , has to be ne-
tuned for a given discount factor  in order to obtain Theorem 1. We now show why
Theorem 1 does not hold if the rate of adaptation is too slow or too fast.
First, let us show that the rate of adaptation should be a function of  and, as
 approaches one, 1    should approach zero. In other words, a strategy based on
discounted past payos with a given rate of adaptation 1    independent of  will
fail to guarantee a future expected payo arbitrarily close to that of the best expert,
no matter how patient (or impatient) Agent is.
Before stating the formal result, let us show the intuition behind it. Imagine
that Nature has two states, either Rain or Sun, that occur with probability 1=3
and 2=3, respectively, independently in every period. Agent receives the payo of
I if she forecasts the state of Nature correctly, otherwise she receives zero. There
are two constant experts: one always forecasts Rain, the other always Sun. Given
this environment, the best strategy for Agent, regardless of her discount factor, is
to forecast Sun in each period, in other words, to always follow the recommendation
18of the expert that forecasts Sun. This is what happens asymptotically when Agent
bases her forecast on past average payos. Past frequencies, due to the law of large
numbers, eventually reect true probabilities and hence she will learn to forecast the
more likely event. Now consider an adaptive Agent. More recent events receive more
weight, and after a suciently long sequence of periods in which Rain occurred she
will essentially ignore what happened before this sequence and hence forecast Rain.
Of course, the event that such a sequence occurs has a low probability. Yet, this
probability is strictly positive, thus preventing Agent from learning to forecast Sun
in each period.
Proposition 3 Fix  2 (0;1). Then there exists "0 > 0 such that for every  2 (0;1)
there does not exist a better-reply strategy based on past -discounted payos that is
sequentially "0-optimal.
Second, let us show why it is important for the strategy to be suciently adaptive,
in other words, what can go wrong when the rate of adaptation is too small. Consider
rst the canonical model in which Agent bases here future choice on past average
payos. Almost all up-to-date literature (with exception of Marden et al. 2007, Mallet
et al. 2009, Zapechelnyuk 2008, and Lehrer and Solan 2009) chooses this model.
More specically, for every history ht, the next-period mixed action of Agent is a
function of C1;t only: pt+1 = (C1;t). These strategies become decreasingly adaptive
over time, their rate of adaptation is equal to 1=t after t periods. When some expert
that has been the best so far becomes non-optimal, it may take a very long time for
Agent to learn this and to start following the recommendation of a dierent expert.
The later the period, the longer it will take Agent to adapt to changes. Thus, no
matter how patient Agent is, after suciently many periods there will be histories
such that Agent may not want to wait until her past average payos are able capture
changes in the environment. Thus, the problem of dynamic consistency arises. After
some time and some histories Agent will prefer to \forget" the past and to restart the
strategy from the empty history. Therefore, these strategies fail to be dynamically
consistent as dened by our concept of sequential "-optimality.
To illustrate, let us return to our previous example and consider a non-stationary
environment in which Sun occurs in periods 1 to m and Rain occurs forever thereafter.
Given T 2 N; if m is suciently large, then Agent will forecast Sun in periods
19m+1;:::;m+T even though Rain occurs in each of these periods. Payos in periods
m + 1 to m + T are equal to 0 and hence in those periods they are far from that of
the best expert. So for any given discount factor  ( < 1), one only has to choose m
suciently large to make Agent unwilling to maintain her strategy at period m + 1.
Proposition 4 For every " < I=2 and every  2 (0;1) there exists 0 < 1 such that
there does not exist a better-reply strategy based on past average or past -discounted
payos with  > 0 that is sequentially "-optimal.
In particular, this proposition shows that none of the popular \no regret" strate-
gies considered in the literature, referring to Hart and Mas-Colell's (2000) regret
matching, lp-norm strategies of Hart and Mas-Colell (2001a) and Cesa-Bianchi and
Lugosi (2003), as well as the ctitious play and its smooth variants, satisfy the ob-
jective of sequential rationality (or dynamic consistency) that is the focus of this
paper.
Remark 1 Assume briey that Agent does not discount future payos, but instead
is concerned in each period t with average payos in the next T periods. Proposition
4 immediately extends. This follows directly from our example above in which we
demonstrated how it can happen that Agent attains the lowest payo in T consecutive
periods when conditioning play on past average payos.
Similarly, our main result, Theorem 1, extends. When Agent is concerned with
average payos in the next T periods, then the regret matching based on past -
discounted payos generates a sequentially "-optimal strategy provided  is chosen
appropriately and T is suciently large. The important underlying assumption is
that the decision problem is stationary, that is, in every period Agent is concerned
about the same horizon T of future payos.
Remark 2 We hasten to point out that if Agent faces a nitely repeated decision
problem with T periods, then sequentially "-optimal strategies fail to exist when
" < I=2, regardless of how past information is used. The intuition is simple. After
facing T   1 periods, Agent is only concerned with her payo in the nal period T.
Since Nature's strategy is arbitrary, the past information is irrelevant. Thus, Agent
can guarantee only the maximin payo, in our above example this is I=2, while the
payo of the best expert in the nal round is equal to I:
206 The Role of the Discount Factor
In this paper, the discount factor is a parameter that describes the patience of the
decision maker (who we call Agent), her intertemporal preferences that relate today's
and tomorrow's utility. The statement in Theorem 1 may leave an impression that a
more patient decision maker can achieve a better result in terms of discounted future
payos. In this section we argue that this need not be true, and that the relationship
between the discount factor and learning the best strategy is far more complex.
Recall that in this paper the decision maker's objective is to do as well as the best
expert, and we nd a more patient decision maker can get closer to the best expert.
Consider now an outside observer who measures the performance of the decision maker
by her long-run average payo. What is the value for the decision maker of following
the best expert from the perspective of the observer? The answer is not trivial, since
an expert's discounted future payo depends on the decision maker's discount factor,
. When  is higher, then maximum discounted payo among experts can be higher
when the environment is stationary, but it can be lower when the environment is
non-stationary. Indeed, an expert who is best in the long run is not getting very good
short-run average payos if the environment is changing. Therefore, it could well be
that for the observer a less patient decision maker will show a better performance
than a more patient one.
To illustrate, consider our example from the previous section. In every period
Nature chooses Rain or Sun, the decision maker needs to forecast the state of Nature,
and there are two constant experts: one always forecasts Rain, the other always Sun.
Suppose that Nature deterministically alternates between m periods of Sun and m
periods of Rain. To be as good as the best expert on average in the long run means
here to correctly predict the state of Nature half of the time. To be as good as the
best expert in the next period (i.e., when  = 0) means to correctly predict the state
in each period. Of course it is impossible to perform as well as the best expert,
since the strategy of Nature is unknown. It follows that an impatient decision maker
aspires to a higher goal than a patient one, as she wishes to achieve a high payo
in every short run, as opposed to achieving a high average payo in the long run.
We can now explain the trade-o between focusing on long run payos and short run
payos as follows. In the long run one can get arbitrarily close to the payo of the
21best expert, as her performance is based on all periods, and hence the entire past can
be used to learn which expert is the best. The downside is that the long run payo
will not be very large if the environment is changing. When focusing on performance
of the best expert in the short run, one has higher goals, as now one is ne-tuning the
best expert to the upcoming environments, ignoring those in the distant future. The
disadvantage is that it is harder to reach these goals, to get close to the best expert
for the near future. The reason is that one cannot use information from the distant
past as it may not be relevant. Instead one needs to focus on more recent past which
essentially limits the amount of information one is gathering. This is best seen by
our result that information from the recent past is not enough to learn which action
is best in a stationary environment (see the example in Section 5).
Note that a higher goal may be alternatively set by adding more sophisticated ex-
perts that take into account past dependencies and adjust to changing environments.
However, one has to be aware of the fact that there are many ways to condition on
the past. In fact, one cannot add all experts that condition on the payos obtained
in the previous period when innitely many payos can be realized. Even when there
are only nitely many payos, the set of all experts that condition on the past k
rounds increases exponentially in k . This makes the task of selecting the set of ex-
perts particularly dicult as the precision of how close the decision maker can get to
the payo of the best expert negatively depends on the number of experts. In con-
trast, reducing the discount factor is a unidimensional problem that highlights in a
simple way the trade-o between adapting to a changing environment and gathering
sucient information to be able to adapt.
It would be interesting to consider the framework where the decision maker sets
her goals by strategically choosing the discount factor. We leave formalization and
analysis of this problem for future research. Here we only note that a decision maker
who is interested in long-run average payos may wish to decrease the discount factor
away from 1, understanding the trade-o between a higher aspiration level when  is
smaller and more ecient learning when  is larger. In applications this is done by
calibrating  to past observations, as undergone by Mallet et al. (2009).
227 Noisy Observations
In this section we return to our basic model and extend it to allow for observations
of expert payos to be noisy. We will show that Theorem 1 continues to hold, with
a slightly looser upper bound due to the additional source of error.
In our basic model, Agent observes the state of nature and computes the forgone
payo of not following the recommendation a
j
t of expert j in period t as u(a
j
t;!t).
Suppose now that Agent does not observe states of Nature. Instead, she only observes
payos, and these are subject to noise. Let ~ ut (0) be Agent's observed payo generated
in period t and let ~ ut(j) be that of expert j. We assume that
~ ut(0) = (1   )ut(at;!t) + t(0);
~ ut(j) = (1   )ut(a
j
t;!t) + t(j) for j 2 J:
Here  is a parameter that measures the level of contamination of Agent's information
and satises 0   < 1. The only assumption on noisy payos is that they satisfy
the same constraints as the true payos, namely for every t = 1;2;::: and every
j 2 J [ f0g,
0  ~ ut(j)  I: (10)
In particular, no assumptions are made on the relationship of the noise of dierent
experts in dierent periods.
The following examples fall within this framework.
(i) Agent's payos are perfectly observable, while those of experts can be noisy.
So noise in observed experts' payos only matters for those experts who have chosen




t = at: For
instance, one can model the situation where with some probability bounded above by
 expert 1 acts as if he obtained the payo of the best expert in that period (instead
of her reporting his own).
(ii) Payos are perfectly observable, but experts possibly do not face the same
state as Agent does. Here  is the maximal probability that expert j does not face
the same state as Agent in period t. The probability of facing a dierent state than
Agent can be drawn independently for each period. It could also be that some experts
simply never face the environment of Agent.
23(iii) Sometimes an expert's payos are not observable. With probability smaller
than  the payo of expert j is not observed in period t. In this case t(j) is a
part of the strategy of Agent and we set t(j) = 0. Analogous to (ii), there are no
assumptions on how the event that the payo of expert j is not observed in period
t depends on other events. Here the most natural model is the case where the event
that the payo of expert j is observed is independent of whether payos of other
experts were observed.
We continue to measure performance by discounting the past, the only dierence
is that these calculations are now based on the noisy payos ~ ut(j). Specically, the
past -discounted payo of expert j is dened the same way as before, C;0(j) = 0,
and for every t  1
C;t(j) = C;t 1(j) + (1   )~ ut(j):
Future performance is still measured in terms of discounted future payos, here only
the true utilities ut matter. Let Ut; (j) be the discounted future payo of expert
j. The same notations with \" refer to the corresponding expressions with noisy
payos. Let t;(j) = (1   )
P1
i=0 it+i(j).
There is no need for new proofs. Following Theorem 1 we know there exists "
such that ~ Ut;  ~ Ut; (j)   " for all t and all j. Thus, we obtain that
(1   )Ut;  (1   )Ut; (j) + (t; (j)   t;(0))   "
and hence
Ut;  Ut; (j) +

1   




This leads us to the next proposition, in particular we nd that Theorem 1 continues
to hold.
Proposition 5 Given discount factor  and observation of noisy payos, let ;bt 2
[0;I] be such that E (t (j)jht 1) 2 [bt;bt + ] for all t and all ht 1 then regret-matching
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Note that when  = 0, the above bound is precisely the bound (6) for the noiseless
environment increased by the factor of 1=(1   ): The eect of noise is rather small:
24if, for instance, the information is contaminated by 10% ( = 0:1), then the resulting
bound is greater only by about 11%. When  > 0 then there is an additional term
reecting the dierence between the expected utility observed by Agent and expected
utility generated for Agent.
8 Discussion and Conclusion
In conclusion, we discuss various issues related to our results.
A comment on Propositions 1 and 6. The proofs of the central result of this
paper, Proposition 1, and its counterpart that concerns probabilistic bounds, Propo-
sition 6 in Appendix B, contain new elements. As in Hart and Mas-Colell (2000),
we use a quadratic potential function to bound past regret, but we cannot use the
Approachability Theorems (Hart and Mas-Colell, 2001a; Lehrer, 2003) to derive our
result, as they apply to averaging the past, while we discount the past. Further steps
that are new in our proofs involve connecting discounted past payos to discounted
future payos (in Proposition 1), and extension of the Hoeding-Azuma inequality
to innite series and its use in deriving probabilistic bounds (Proposition 6).
Convex action sets. Our sequentially "-optimal strategy is randomized as it spec-
ies to adapt recommendations probabilistically whenever at least two experts have
performed strictly better than Agent. However, there are applications where it is
does not seem desirable to follow advice according to a lottery outcome. Instead, one
would expect Agent to nd a compromise in such situations. For instance, assume
that Agent is a nancial broker and there are two experts, E1 and E2, who did equally
well in the past and better than Agent herself. Suppose that for the next period ex-
pert E1 recommends to increase holding of a certain stock by 20%, while expert E2
recommends to do nothing. Then a reasonable action for Agent is to increase the
stock holding by some amount between 0 and 20%. To make this behavior possible,
two additional assumptions are necessary. First, Agent's set of actions, A, should
be convex, so that \compromise" actions exist. Second, Agent should be risk averse
and prefer compromises to lotteries. That is, her utility function, u(a;!), should be
(weakly) concave in a. Under these assumptions Agent choose the expected action
resulting from the randomized strategy. In the above example she should increase
25the stock holding by x% where x is the probability of following expert E1 under
the randomized strategy. With this modication all our results go through without
changes.
Behavior of Nature independent of Agent's actions. In many situations it is not
natural to assume that the state of Nature depends on previous choices of Agent.
For such applications where Nature is less powerful one may wonder if our bound
would look dierent. However this is not the case. The statements in Theorem 1
and Proposition 1 have to hold for every deterministic sequence of states of Nature,
including those sequences that, by coincidence, ex post look like Nature has been
conditioning the choice of its states on Agent's past actions.
Bounded-recall strategies. A dierent way of designing strategies that are able to
adapt to changing environments is to use bounded recall, where Agent observes only
the information from a certain number of the last periods (Zapechelnyuk, 2008; Lehrer
and Solan, 2009). It is an open question whether our objective can be achieved by
these strategies. Note, however, that bounded recall strategies are more computation-
ally complex than strategies based on discounting the past. In order to implement a
bounded recall strategy with length of recall m, a decision maker has to remember the
information about each of the last m periods. For our strategy based on discounted
past payos she needs to remember the accumulated discounted value of payos for
each expert and for herself from the last period and update this with information in
every period. So Agent's memory consists of N + 1 real numbers (in particular, she
does not have to remember which period she is in).
The problem of expert selection. A special feature in this literature on learning in
an unknown environment is the way in which one deals with the complexity of the
environment. One cannot hope to perform well in each period, thus one compares
performance to a given nite set of experts or benchmark strategies. An open question
not analyzed in this paper is how to choose such experts. The more experts there
are, the higher is our bound, as it increases with
p
N and it does not depend on the
specic types of experts. Naturally the bound can be lowered if one adds assumptions
on the relationship between the experts. Note that it does not make sense to add
new experts that are convex combinations of the existing experts. This is because
our bound not only applies to the given nite set of experts, but also to their convex
26hull. A more general analysis of the interplay between experts and the bound is not
straightforward and hence is left for future research.
The multi-armed bandit setting. Consider learning under partial information where
Agent observes only own payos but not payos of any other actions chosen by
experts. Here we explain how to extend our algorithm to derive the same result as in
Theorem 1.
Since the foregone payos are not observed, we use the trick of Auer et al. (1995)
to construct their unbiased estimates. Dene the estimate ^ ut(j) of a payo of each
expert j in every period t as ut=p
j
t if expert j's recommendation is chosen in period
t, and ^ ut(j) = 0 otherwise. Then, in each period with probability 1    use our
strategy p applied to the past -discounted estimated payos, and with probability
 follow the recommendation of a random expert, choosing each expert equally likely.
These adjustments can be easily accounted for in our proofs to yield a result as in
Theorem 1. The parameter  > 0 is called the rate of experimentation, its value can
be ne-tuned for the best performance. Naturally, the new bound as in Proposition
1 will be larger, as now Agent conditions her decisions on much less information.
Other questions for future research. We consider learning with full information
and include an extension where there are errors in observability of past payos. A
natural extension is to consider the so-called bandit setting where only payos of the
action chosen are observed (but not the forgone payos).15 Another natural road for
future research is to consider how our strategy performs in games. The approach
in the present literature has been to get good performance in terms of learning by
focusing on conditional regrets, which can be modeled by considering special experts
that condition their play on the outcome in the past period (e.g., Hart and Mas-Colell,
2000; Hart, 2005).
Appendix A: Proofs
Below are the proofs omitted in the previous sections. In order to retain proximity to
the literature we formulate proofs in terms of regrets. We use the following notation.
15See Hart and Mas-Colell (2001b) for similar results in the setting of Hannan regret learning and
Foster and Young (2006) in the setting of regret testing.
27For every period t and every j 2 J denote by rt(j;at;!t) the instantaneous regret




In later proofs we will use the fact that jr(j;at;!t)j  I (since the utilities are in
[0;I]). Dene Agent's discounted future regret for expert j 2 J at time t0 by





Observe that Rt0;(j) = Ut0;(j) Ut0;(0) for j 2 J: Then a strategy p is sequentially
"-optimal if for every strategy q of Nature, every initial period t0 and every initial
history ht0 1,
E [Rt0;(j)jht0 1]  ":






and let D;t(j) be the following measure of discounted past regrets:





Observe that D1;t(j) = C1;t (j) C1;t (0) and D;t(j) = C;t (j) C;t (0) for all j 2 J:
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Consider discounted future regrets from the perspective of time t0: Suppose that










;t(j) = minfD;t(j);0g, j 2 J. Also, denote by rt and
D;t the correspondent vectors of instantaneous and discounted past regrets, i.e.,
rt = (rt(j))j2J and D;t = (D;t(j))j2J. The proof is divided into three steps.
Step 1. For every t = 1;2;::: we dene Xt = D
+
;t 1  rt and show that
E [Xtjht 1]  D
+
;t 1  E [rtjht 1] = 0:
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1   2 ; (13)
where bt0;bt0+1;::: are some positive bounded coecients.
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Proof of Step 1. Suppose that D
+
;t 1(j) > 0 for some j 2 J (otherwise it
is immediate that D
+






;t 1(j0) to action recommended by expert j. Hence, for



































t(a), k 2 J. Therefore,
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where the inequality follows from D
 
;t being the closest point to D;t in R
jAj
  . Since
the instantaneous regret in every period is bounded by I, we have (rt   D
 
;t 1)2 








;t 1 = 0, and
replacing D
+






t 1 + 2(1   )Xt + (1   )
2  4I
2N:

















By the fact that 2
























































































4(1   )2 + (1   )2
1   2 ;
where bt0;bt0+1;::: are the resulting coecients on the respective Xt. The coecient
of Xi in (15) corresponding to 2
t is equal to 2(1   )2(t i) provided t0  i  t: So
we obtain for every t  t0








1   2 : (16)














D;t(j)  D;t(j); j 2 J: (17)
Next, using (17), we obtain













t t0D;t(j); j 2 J: (18)






t t0D;t = (1   )((1   )rt0 + D;t0 1)
+ (1   )((1   )(rt0+1 + rt0) + 
2D;t0 1)
+ (1   )




= (1   )(1   )(rt0 + rt0+1 + 
2rt0+2 + :::)
+ (1   )(1   )(rt0 + rt0+1 + 
2rt0+2 + :::)
+ ::: + (1   )(D;t0 1 + D;t0 1 + ()
2D;t0 1 + :::)


























Step 3 is immediate by (18) and (19). End of Proof.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
The proof is straightforward but tedious so we here only show how to verify the
claims. Set y = 1   , x = 1    and z = y=x:
31We show how to prove (7). Let g (x;z) be the dierence between the expression
given in (6) and the rst term in (7). So we wish to show that g (x;z) = O(x + z)
which is established by verifying the following: g (0;0) = 0; d
dxg (x;z) is bounded for
each given z and d
dzg (x;z) is bounded for each given x:
We now show how to derive (9). Replace in (7) each appearance of the symbol O
with a dierent constant and then take the derivative with respect to x. Then show

















The asymptotic bound given in (8) is derived by taking the dierence between the




1    + 2
p
1   ; setting x = 1
2
p
y and then expanding
with respect to y:
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
The proposition is proven by example. Normalize utilities such that I = 1: Consider
two actions H and T, two states H and T and payos given by u(a;a0) = 1 if a = a0
and u(a;a0) = 0 if a 6= a0: There are two experts, labeled H and T, who forecast
constant actions, H and T, respectively. Suppose that states H and T are realized
with probability  and 1   , respectively, independently in all periods.
Fix  < 1 and consider any better-reply strategy p of Agent based on -discounted
past regret. Note that r(T;at;!t) = 1 if at = H and !t = T and r(T;at;!t) =  1
if at = !t = H and r(T;at;!t) = 0 otherwise. So the regret for not choosing T only
depends on states that realize in rounds in which H is chosen. Recall that D;t(T) =
(1   )
Pt
i=0 t ir(T;at;!t): We derive a lower bound on Pr(D;t(T) > 0jnt (H) = n)
where nt (H) = #ft0  t : at0 = Hg:
Fix m  nt (H). Let 1;2;:::;nt(H) be the subsequence of periods up to t where
Agent played H. The probability that regrets are equal to 1 in the m most recent
periods in which H was played is equal to (1   )
m : If regrets are equal to 1 in the m
most recent periods, then D;t(T) is smallest if all previous regrets are equal to  1:










nt(H) (1   2
m):
32So if we choose m = m() such that 1   2m() > 0 and if nt (H)  m() then
Pr(D;t(T) > 0jnt (H)  m())  (1   )
m() :
In fact, our above calculations show that
Pr(D;t(T) > 0jnt (H) > 0)  (1   )
m() :
Similarly we verify that Pr(D;t(H) < 0jnt (T) > 0)  m(). Moreover, condi-
tional on t and on nt (H); D;t(T) and D;t(H) are independent random variables.
Hence
Pr(D;t(T) > 0 > D;t(H)j0 < nt (H) < t)  ( (1   ))
m() :
Consider a path on which agent plays both H and T: If D;t(T) > 0 > D;t(H)
then by the better reply property at+1 = T: We have thus put a lower bound on
the probability of choosing action T where this lower bound does not depend on :
Assume that  > 1=2: This means that H is the better action, then
R1; (T)  ( (1   ))
m() (2   1):
which is a strictly positive lower bound that does not depend on :
In order to get around the nal case in which agent plays H in all rounds we
assume that nature chooses before period 1 equally likely  2 f0:4;0:6g: All bounds
above are cut in half which does not change the result to be proven.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 4
The proposition is proven by example. Normalize utilities such that I = 1: Consider
the example used in the proof of Proposition 3. Assume w.l.o.g. that Agent chooses
H in period 1 with probability at least 1=2: Fix an integer m and let Nature select
state H in periods t = 1;:::;m. If Agent have chosen H in period 1, then r1 (H) = 0
and r1 (T) =  1: By the better reply condition, Agent will choose H in period 2 and
analogously also in all periods 3  t  m + 1:
Consider rst the past-average payo criterion. Note that mD1;m(T) =  m and
mD1;m (H) = 0: In periods t = m+1;m+2;:::;2m let Nature choose state T. Then
(m + 1)D1;m+1(T) =  m+1 and Agent continues to choose H up to period 2m, and
only in period 2m her past average regret for T becomes zero, D1;2m(T) = 0:
33Let us now evaluate the discounted future regret at period m+1. Since rt (T) = 1
for m + 1  t  2m, we obtain





mR2m+1;(T)  1   2
m:
Hence, given  < 1 and " > 0, if m is suciently large, then Rm+1;(T) > 1   ":
Now consider the past -discounted payo criterion. It can be veried that in
this case Agent will choose H in periods m + 1;m + 2;:::;2m   1 if  = (m) is
close enough to 1. Hence, Rm+1;(T)  1 2m 1 > " if m is suciently large, which
completes the proof.
Appendix B: Probabilistic Bounds
The literature on regret-minimizing decision making is concerned with almost sure
upper bounds on maximum regret that Agent may accumulate during the play. As
noted by Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi (2006), these bounds will never be small when the
strategy is based on -discounted past payos. This is because the overweighing of
the last observation adds to the process a positive variance that never vanishes.
The goal of this section is to provide upper bounds on Agent's realized past -
discounted payo, as well as on realized future -discounted payo with a given prob-
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Proposition 6 Suppose that Agent has discount factor  and uses the regret-matching
strategy based on past -discounted payos. Then for every time t, every history ht 1



















We wish to consider these bounds when  is close to 1: Assume that  is chosen
to minimize the bound on expected payo given in (6), so  = 1   1
2
p
















1    + 2I
p





















These bounds are easily veried.
To proof Proposition 6 we rst extend the Hoeding-Azuma inequality (Hoeding,
1963; Azuma, 1967) to innite sums of dependent bounded random variables centered
at conditional expectation.
Lemma 1 Let Z1;Z2;::: be an innite sequence of random variables that satisfy















Proof of Lemma 1. Suppose that
P1
t=1(bt   at)2 < 1 (otherwise inequal-
ity (22) holds trivially). It is sucient to prove the claim when at  0  bt and
E (ZtjZt 1;:::;Z1) = 0 holds for all t. Dene Z0
t = Zt   E[ZtjZt 1;:::;Z1]. Following


















































































t=T0 (bt   at)
2 = 0, we obtain (22). End of Proof.
































using the extended Hoeding-Azuma in-
equality from Lemma 1.
First, let us deal with
p
2
























i = 2(1   )

























































































































 1   ;
and inequality (20) is straightforward by (25).
Now, let us deal with (1   )
P1
t=t0 t t02













4(1   )2 + (1   )2
1   2 ; (28)
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t  " + I
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4(1   )2 + (1   )2
1   2

 1   ;
and inequality (21) is straightforward by (26). End of Proof
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